Introduction
Florida is an important state of united sate of
America. The importance of Florida in the economic
progress is cannot be ignored by the government
of USA. The atmospheric disaster that accorded
in Florida and other states of the USA stunned
the government and the other authorities of the
world. The amount of loss incurred due to this
atmospheric disaster was huge.
The mostly suffered sector was the insurance market.
As the large areas and the property were insured
the most of the burden was on the insurance companies.
The result of that was the bankruptcy of many
insurance companies in the US. The governments
of the United Sates of America make emergency
measures in order to minimize the loss accrued
to the state.
The measures taken by the state was soly to compensate
the people and the owners of the insurance companies
in the Florida and the effected cities. (Bush
et al 2004) The social and political conditions
were damaged in this disaster and the government
took keen interest in rectifying the problem as
early as possible. The economic conditions were
the most effected in this disaster, many companies,
public places and other areas were affected.
The coastal areas were totally destroyed by this
atmospheric disaster that accorded in August.
Florida being one of the prime cities of USA from
both the economical and the cultural aspects the
disaster caused a great concern among the people
and the authorities of the estate. The replanting
of the city started very quickly and the great
cooperation was shown by the people. The relief
fund was set quit earl by the government. The
Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund has not been
hit hard by the recent hurricanes.
This fund pays 90% of personal lines losses from
each named hurricane that hits the state after
an industry deductible of $4.5bn. This fund had
$15bn of capital at the start of the hurricane
season. Morgan Stanley estimates that the first
three hurricanes — Charley, Frances and
Ivan — cost it no more than $3bn. Citizens
Property Insurance Corporation, however, is in
worse shape. This is the state insurer of last
resort for homeowners in high-risk regions who
cannot get coverage in the private market. It
is estimated that Hurricane Charley cost Citizens
$925m and that Frances cost it between $250m and
$300m.
It is thought that most of these losses would
have happened in its high risk account. This account
represents 95% of the business it writes and has
$1.1bn of capital. Government has taken great
precautions know so that such trouble may not
occur in the future as this has caused great concern
to all the authorities of different sectors and
even the general public also. The stunning 2004
hurricane season highlights the folly of developing
high-risk coastal areas. (Birger, 2004)
Yet in the wake of the destruction, the emphasis
is already being put on rebuilding in the same
high-hazard zones. This pattern of coming back
"bigger and better" has been repeated
numerous times in recent decades — such
as the pushes after Hurricane Frederic on the
Gulf Coast (1979) and after Hurricane Opal in
the Florida Panhandle (1995) — setting the
stage for greater financial loss, worsening evacuation
efficacy, and increasing the potential for greater
loss of life in the next storm. Simply put, many
coastal-zone properties should not be developed.
Design and engineering is not going to change
the rate of sea-level rise nor lessen the frequency
or intensity of storms and their associated winds,
waves, storm surge, and runoff. It is true that
we have gotten better at predicting storm paths
and evacuating threatened areas. People are even
designing structures that can withstand much higher
winds than in the past. But ultimately, developing
high-risk areas is a losing battle, maybe not
for the builder, but certainly for the homeowner
and the general public.
The rush to the shore in recent decades has resulted
in population growth rates three times the national
average for areas within 5 miles of the shoreline.
The resulting demand for ocean views and beach
and waterfront access encourages development in
high-to-extreme-risk areas, such as the beachfront,
on lowlands adjacent to sounds, and next to finger
canals — placing ever-increasing property
investments and more residents at risk from the
impact of storm winds, waves, and flooding. The
concentration of population and vulnerable development
is especially alarming given the projected increase
in hurricane frequency and intensity due to changing
cyclical climatic patterns and possibly from global
warming, which portends an ominous future for
coastal disasters. The problem must be addressed
now. (Birger, 2004)
Storm History — Learning From The Past
The probability that a hurricane will make landfall
at any given point along the coast in any given
year is low, and the probability of a great hurricane
almost makes such an event seem unlikely; but
low probabilities give a false sense of security.
If probability is a guidepost, then planners and
designers should consider the probability of a
major storm occurring during the lifetime of the
structure. In that view, storm history tells us
that such a storm is almost a certainty. Furthermore,
as we've seen from the convergences of Charlie,
Ivan, and others, the occurrence of one hurricane
does not reduce the likelihood that a similar
storm will strike again in the remainder of the
season, next year, or in multiple years to come.
Thanks to Weather Service warnings, radio and
television communications, and evacuation plans,
death tolls from modern hurricanes have declined.
But this decline has also led to a false sense
of security and contributed to complacency about
controlling coastal growth. Hence, while storm
deaths have declined, damage totals have increased
dramatically. Much of this cost is born not by
coastal residents and developers, but by all taxpayers
and any member of the general public who pays
an insurance premium. Not surprisingly, greater
degree of property loss parallels the number of
unsafe developments, those where the carrying
capacity of the coastal zone has been exceeded.
Population growth has reached such levels that
it has begun to exceed the capacity for safe evacuation.
Evacuation time in some areas takes considerably
longer than the minimum time allowed for advance
evacuation warning (as little as 9 to 12 hours).
The knowledge of coastal hazards, carrying capacity,
storm history, and risk mapping has been in place
since the 1970s, but the coastal community at
large has ignored this available science. Federal
and state regulations of the coastal zone under
the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Coastal Barrier
Resources Act, the National Flood Insurance Program,
and similar programs also have failed to check
unsafe development or the escalating costs of
storm damage. For example, much of the northern
end of North Topsail Beach, North Carolina, is
in a coastal barrier resources zone designated
so that newly constructed homes and businesses
are not eligible for national flood insurance.
However, after Hurricane Fran (1996), federal
assistance was provided to the town to rebuild
infrastructure such as roads and bridges, which
allow for future continued development, thus defeating
the goal of the federal program.
Hazards, Economics, and Politics
Nature is not the only arena of the coastal zone,
and hazardous processes are not the only players.
Property owners, planners, and public officials
can mitigate the impact of hazards, but their
domain is one of politics and economics, governed
by a unique set of rules. Our survey of coastal
communities reveals great diversity in responses,
yet enough similarities exist among communities
to make several generalizations. (Bush et al 2004)
One incongruity in coastal development is that
development sites are chosen on the basis of market
forces, not Nature's forces. As a result, most
coastal communities came into existence without
hazard planning, although there are a few exceptions,
such as
Kiawah Island, South Carolina, and Seaside, Florida.
In older developments, residents learned from
experience, and low-risk sites tended to be developed
first, leaving high-risk areas, such as the New
Jersey Shore and Orange Beach, Alabama, to accommodate
today's spiraling growth. With most recent coastal
development, the emphasis is on build and sell,
not analysis of hazard risk, hazard mitigation,
or future relocation. Furthermore, the construction
industry prospers in the post-storm rush to rebuild.
As a result, one catastrophe often sets the stage
for bigger catastrophes. Post-catastrophe "recovery"
becomes a time of shock and haste to put things
right again. Instead of implementing recovery
efforts result in houses and multihousing units
rebuilt "bigger and better" in the same
high-risk zones (Bush et al 2004)
While Disasters Can Cause A World of Hurt, They
Rarely Harm Home Prices
Hurricane Charley did a prime number on Florida's
Sanibel Island, toppling phone poles, ripping
roofs off beachfront homes and uprooting stately
palms and Australian pines that canopied the resort's
main roads. That was on Aug. 13. On Aug. 14, Charlie
Ashby's VIP Realty firm sold a four-bedroom, four-bathroom
Sanibel house for $1.1 million-just a shade below
the asking price. Surprised? Don't be. Hurricanes
Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne were devastating
in terms of lost lives and damaged property, but
this fearsome foursome hasn't dealt all that much
of a blow yet to Florida real estate values. Ashby
reports that while sales volume has slowed in
Sanibel (homeowners are more focused on cleanup
and repairs), home prices have been stable. Real
estate experts who've studied natural and man-made
disasters around the country say this is typical.
Consider Hurricane Hugo, the category 4 brute
that ravaged Charleston, S.C. in September 1989.
Three months after the deluge, real estate prices
in Charleston were still up 6%, year
over year. Similar story in San Francisco following
the October 1989 earthquake: By December, San
Francisco home prices had risen 16% from the previous
year. An even more stunning example comes from
Harrisburg, Pa., a few miles from the infamous
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Two studies
found that the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island
had no discernible impact on local home prices.
That's right: The neighborhood nuke comes this
close to a meltdown-and property values don't
even shudder.
Putting the Firm in Terra Firma
Why is real estate so resilient? One answer can
be found in the structure of our housing-finance
system. Banks often won't lend money to purchase
severely damaged homes, and that creates a natural
brake on panic selling-a bit like the old five-day
waiting period for gun purchases. Once insurance
has been collected and repairs completed, homeowners
have largely regained their bearings and no longer
entertain lowball offers. Sereta Churchill, owner
of a Century 21 franchise in San Francisco, says
that while her market shrugged off the '89 quake,
well-heeled speculators did snap up bargains after
the Oakland fires in '91. Residents were so distraught
that many wouldn't consider moving back. A seller's
mistake, in hindsight: Prices rebounded-and then
some-after the rebuilding. Advice to anyone in
a disaster area is to recover emotionally before
you start making life-altering decisions about
moving out of an area. Memories fade, and that
influences our perception of risk. Research shows
that when disasters like floods or hurricanes
occur less frequently than once every seven years,
people's behavior does not change.
Floridians are hardly strangers to hurricanes.
What they aren't used to are four separate category
3 storms coming ashore during a single season.
The last time three hurricanes hit Florida in
one year was 1964, and the last time four hurricanes
hit any state was in Texas in 1886. The odds of
a meteorological repeat next year are slim, but
climatologists do think Florida is entering a
period of increased hurricane activity, one in
which upper air currents will steer hurricanes
toward Florida rather than out to sea. If multiple
hurricanes become a regular enough occurrence,
residents may decide to leave. Skyrocketing insurance
premiums will give some little choice. Retirees
may be the quickest to defect. "Older people
are very risk-averse," (Bush et al 2004)
says Neil Binder, head of Bellmarc Realty, a New
York City firm with snowbird clients. "They're
going down there for a settled lifestyle, and
suddenly their home is gone. They're saying, 'What
do I need this for?' “(Bush et al 2004)
Is 2004 a Weather Channel anomaly? Stay tuned.
Meantime, agents are hopeful that Florida's five-year-old
property boom will weather the storms. Prices
in Fort Myers, Miami and West Palm Beach had been
rising at annualized rates of 15% or more, although
Beverly Rothstein, a broker with Exit Team Realty
in Coral Springs, expects hurricane fatigue to
temper rates of increase. Even so, buyers (including
speculators now descending on Florida for bargains)
are deluding themselves if they expect the storms
to blow in actual declines. "Prices are not
going down," Rothstein insists. "This
is the strongest real estate market I've ever
encountered, and I don't think hurricanes or any
other natural disasters are going to wipe it out."
(Birger, 2004)
Hurricane Season Puts Florida Workers to Test
Public health workers in Florida have had their
prepared ness skills put to the test after the
state endured one of its worst hurricane seasons
ever. Beginning in mid-August, Hurricane Charley
was the first of four hurricanes to hit the state
over the span of a little more than a month. Charley
was followed by Hurricane Frances, which touched
down Labor Day weekend, Hurricane Ivan, which
pummeled the Florida Panhandle Sept. 16, and Hurricane
Jeanne, which came ashore on the state's east
coast the weekend of Sept. 24. Before reaching
Florida, Jeanne devastated Haiti, leaving more
than 1,000 dead, thousands injured and hundreds
missing as well as creating massive floods and
dangerously unsanitary conditions, according to
the Pan
American Health Organization, which has called
for millions of dollars in aid. While this year's
Florida hurricanes were unusual, public health
workers in the state have had practice preparing
for the worst in years past. Public health workers
in the state usually spend the days before a hurricane
touches down readying their preparedness infrastructure
and collaborating with fellow first responders.
Hurricane preparedness is divided into pre- and
post-storm responses, according to Jeffrey Gold
Hagen, MD, MPH, director of the Duval County Health
Department in north Florida. Gold Hagen was one
of four participants who took part in a Sept.
21 telephone news conference on "Hurricanes
and Public Health: Views from the Local Level."
"At the end of the day... the health and
well-being of the community falls under the auspices
and responsibility of public health," (Birger,
2004)
Gold Hagen said. Before, during and after a hurricane,
public health workers are responsible for, among
other things, the safety of the sick and elderly,
preventing diarrheal diseases, education on food
and water contamination, watching for the spread
of infectious diseases in shelters and educating
people about carbon monoxide poisoning from generators.
Workers must also ensure that all hospitals, nursing
homes and assisted-living facilities have generators,
medicine supplies and alternative sites for care,
Gold Hagen said. The weight of such preparedness
activities is exacerbated by those evacuating
to safer areas, Gold Hagen noted.
In preparing for hurricanes, workers also implement
an incident command center, which links all response
workers into an integrated communications system,
said Gold Hagen, who noted that resources pumped
into local public health infrastructures for bioterrorism
preparedness during the past few years have been
a great catalyst for bringing first responders
together. Lillian Rivera, MSN, RN, administrator
for the Miami-Dade County Health Department, said
lessons learned more than a decade ago are now
part of her department's hurricane response. In
1992, Hurricane Andrew ravaged southern Florida,
leaving public health workers with one goal: to
be stronger, Rivera said. When Andrew hit, Rivera's
own family was left homeless. “There is
nothing like living through a hurricane to make
you painfully aware of the need for preparation,”
(Birger, 2004)
Rivera said during the Sept. 21 news conference.
Since Hurricane Andrew, Rivera's department has
developed a medical management program consisting
of people who can care for oxygen- and dialysis-dependent
people, help those with special needs and provide
mental health counselors. The department also
deploys workers to parts of the state that need
help. For example, when Hurricane Ivan ripped
through the Panhandle, nurses and environmental
health workers from Miami were sent north, Rivera
said. The Miami-Dade department also operates
a crisis intervention counselor program in collaboration
with the University of Miami and Nova Southeastern
University that develops curricula sensitive to
the area's many different ethnic populations.
Once a storm has passed, public health workers
start implementing surveillance systems to identify
health problems.
Workers also make sure houses are safe for those
with special needs before people begin returning
home from the shelters. The critical issue for
us is surveillance, surveillance, surveillance,
who noted that after Hurricane Frances, area emergency
rooms experienced a rise in diarrheal disease
visits. Michael Caldwell, MD, MPH, president of
the National Association of County and City Health
Officials, noted that public health agencies are
the only public agencies with the expertise to
protect their communities' health when disasters
occur. “The recent hurricanes... have shown
us that we can never let our guard down,"
he said. (Krisberg, 2004)
Citizens May Ask Insurers to Pay a Levy to Fund
Deficit
Four hurricanes have made landfall in the US so
far this hurricane season, making it one of the
worst since Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992. But,
despite the fact that accumulated losses could
now top $25bn, the hurricanes are not expected
to cause an increase in property-catastrophe rates.
Investment bank Morgan Stanley says that, assuming
losses of between $5bn and $7bn from Hurricane
Jeanne — the latest hurricane to hit —
and taking into account losses absorbed by state-sponsored
entities, catastrophe losses for 2004 will be
about 6% of US statutory earned premiums and 4%
of capital. This is a big loss when compared with
the 20-year average loss of 3% of premiums and
between 2% and 3% of capital. But Morgan Stanley
points out those property-catastrophe rates have
only increased sharply twice in the past 15 years
— after Hurricane Andrew and after September
11. Losses from these events were far bigger,
however. They each accounted for between 10% and
13% of premiums and 8% and 9% of capital. The
fact that the market is already hard will discourage
further rate increases, says the investment bank.
But the hurricanes will put a stop to any softening
of rates. There were signs that property-catastrophe
rates were falling before the hurricane season
started. Risk modeling agencies have different
estimates for losses from Hurricane Jeanne. (Reactions,
2004)
The Category 3 hurricane took a similar path across
Florida to Hurricane Frances. Jeanne was more
intense but not as wide or slow moving as Frances,
meaning loss estimates for the hurricanes are
similar. At the time of going to press, AIR Worldwide
estimated Jeanne would cost insurers between $5bn
and $9bn, Risk Management Solutions (RMS) estimated
losses of between $4bn and $8bn, and Eqecat put
losses at between $6bn and $8bn. Accumulated losses
from the four hurricanes that have hit Florida
in recent months could reach $25bn. RMS says that
it would expect losses of this size to occur in
Florida once every 25 to 40 years. It adds that
a fifth hurricane hitting the state this year
would be an extremely rare event. It would expect
this to happen only once in 1,000 years. The hurricane
season ends on November 30.
Insurers and reinsurers with exposure to the hurricanes
appear to be coping well with the losses. They
have been helped by the state-backed pools set
up after Hurricane Andrew. These absorbed much
of the losses. However, it appears that one of
these pools may have exhausted its capital and
will have to call on private insurers to contribute
to the fund through a process known as regular
assessment. The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe
Fund has not been hit hard by the recent hurricanes.
This fund pays 90% of personal lines losses from
each named hurricane that hits the state after
an industry deductible of $4.5bn. This fund had
$15bn of capital at the start of the hurricane
season. Morgan Stanley estimates that the first
three hurricanes — Charley, Frances and
Ivan — cost it no more than $3bn. Citizens
Property Insurance Corporation, however, is in
worse shape. This is the state insurer of last
resort for homeowners in high-risk regions who
cannot get coverage in the private market. It
is estimated that Hurricane Charley cost Citizens
$925m and that Frances cost it between $250m and
$300m. It is thought that most of these losses
would have happened in its high risk account.
This account represents 95% of the business it
writes and has $1.1bn of capital.
Citizens' main exposure is on the south-east coast
of Florida. Its exposure to Ivan should not be
that great because it made landfall well away
from this area. But Jeanne made landfall in a
similar area to Frances and could cost the fund
a similar amount. If Citizens ends any year with
a deficit it asks for payments from the state's
insurers through the regular assessment process.
It can ask insurers for up to $750m for its high
risk account. The amount that insurers pay is
based on their market share in the state. (Reactions,
2004)
Southeast's Record Storm Season
Parts of Florida and the Caribbean are still recovering
from this year's vicious hurricane season, which
was far worse than usual. At press time, two named
storms, Charley and Frances, had already slammed
the Sunshine State, with damages from the latter
estimated at $2 to $4 billion, and a third, Ivan,
poised to strike. Nearly three million Floridians
were ordered to leave their homes in the state's
largest evacuation ever, and power outages affected
up to six million. But good luck and good planning
prevented the storms from devastating local meetings.
In Orlando, all major venues except the Kennedy
Space Center were unharmed, and tourism officials
from Jacksonville to Naples reported that damage
was less than expected. Many planners in Hurricane
Charley's path reported full cooperation from
suppliers, whether they decided to postpone, relocate,
or go forward with events. Hurricane Charley blew
in on Friday, August 13th, but organizers of gatherings
from large to small said they enjoyed good luck
despite the superstitious date. Promise Keepers,
the Denver-based Christian men's association,
had 11,000 registered for its August 13-14 conference
at Orlando's T.D. Waterhouse
Arena; forced to cancel at the last minute, spokesman
Steve Chavis said that thanks to the arena's outstanding
efforts, he managed to rebook the meeting for
November. In Naples, independent planner Jeannie
Strampel convinced her client, Chicago-based ABN
AMRO Bank, to transfer its four-day sales conference
from LaPlaya Beach & Golf Resort so that it
could house some of the 6,000 arriving relief
workers. On 24 hours' notice, Strampel moved the
meeting to the Boca Raton Resort & Club. They
worked 40 hours straight, but in the end all the
functions were flawless and every attendee showed
up.
In Orlando, Cisco Systems planner Scott Tipple
found himself caught by Charley with 45 attendees
yet to arrive for his three-day, 75-person gathering
at Disney's Contemporary Resort in Walt Disney
World. Luckily, all arrived safely; with the help
of Disney's staff, Tipple's meeting went forward
with only minor disruptions. "Many group
commented that this was the first meeting we've
had in four years that didn't have any problems.
Other spots were not so lucky. Although most of
the 700-island nation of the Bahamas sustained
minimal damage in the storms, Grand Bahama Island
was seriously affected by hurricane Frances, forcing
the temporary closure of its airport and several
properties, including the Westin at Our Lucaya,
which is scheduled to re-open on November 1. And
the aftermath of the mean weather continued long
after wind and rain dissipated.
Now, meetings suppliers say they have to convince
planners that affected areas are safe places to
meet, even during hurricane season. They going
to have to salvage the meetings industry in Florida,
of the Greater Fort Lauderdale CVB, told state
tourism leaders in a conference call, according
to The Miami Herald. Nature is not the only arena
of the coastal zone, and hazardous processes are
not the only players. Property owners, planners,
and public officials can mitigate the impact of
hazards, but their domain is one of politics and
economics, governed by a unique set of rules.
Our survey of coastal communities reveals great
diversity in responses, yet enough similarities
exist among communities to make several generalizations.
One incongruity in coastal development is that
development sites are chosen on the basis of market
forces, not Nature's forces. As a result, most
coastal communities came into existence without
hazard planning, although there are a few exceptions,
such as Kiawah Island, South Carolina, and Seaside,
Florida.
In older developments, residents learned from
experience, and low-risk sites tended to be developed
first, leaving high-risk areas, such as the New
Jersey Shore and Orange Beach, Alabama, to accommodate
today's spiraling growth. With most recent coastal
development, the emphasis is on build and sell,
not analysis of hazard risk, hazard mitigation,
or future relocation. Furthermore, the construction
industry prospers in the post-storm rush to rebuild.
As a result, one catastrophe often sets the stage
for bigger catastrophes. Post-catastrophe "recovery"
becomes a time of shock and haste to put things
right again. Instead of implementing recovery
efforts result in houses and multihousing units
rebuilt "bigger and better" in the same
high-risk zones. Public health workers in Florida
have had their prepared ness skills put to the
test after the state endured one of its worst
hurricane seasons ever. Beginning in mid-August,
Hurricane Charley was the first of four hurricanes
to hit the state over the span of a little more
than a month. If probability is a guidepost, then
planners and designers should consider the probability
of a major storm occurring during the lifetime
of the structure. In that view, storm history
tells us that such a storm is almost a certainty.
Furthermore, as we've seen from the convergences
of Charlie, Ivan, and others, the occurrence of
one hurricane does not reduce the likelihood that
a similar storm will strike again in the remainder
of the season, next year, or in multiple years
to come. Thanks to Weather Service warnings, radio
and television communications, and evacuation
plans, death tolls from modern hurricanes have
declined. But this decline has also led to a false
sense of security and contributed to complacency
about controlling coastal growth. (Welch &
Chapman, 2004)
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